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Art no longer affords the satisfaction of spiritual needs which
earlier ages and nations sought in it, and found in it alone ...
Art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a
thing of the past ... [It] invites us to intellectual consideration,
and that not for the purpose of creating art again, but for
knowing philosophically what art is. 1
11lis (abridged) quotation is perhaps the best known from all the
1,200 pages of Hegel's Aesthetics. It is certainly a strange statement.
On the one hand, it still strikes us as bizarre, a senselessly irritating
provocation which (as the English translator suggests) simply cannot
mean what it says. It surely struck Hegel's students and followers in
that way-including, unfortunately, the editor of his lectures, Heinrich
Hotho, who undertook some radical editorial intervention to tone it
down and make it more palatable.2 Felix Mendelsohn, who in the late
'twenties listened to these lectures in Berlin, in a letter to his sister,
wrote of the sheer madness of declaring art mausetot (stone dead)
only a few years after Beethoven's death and a time when Goethe
and Thorwaldsen were still living. Thus the best way to deal with
Hegel's aesthetics is perhaps just to forget about this madness, as is
done for example by its most recent English interpreter, Stephan
Bungay.3
But it is not so easy to forget the 'end of art' when dealing with
Hegel. 11lis is not only because (together with its supplementary,
the paradigmatic character of Greek art) it constitutes one of the most
basic structuring principles of the Aesthetics, so that its omission
inevitably transforms interpretation into a proposal of re-writing (as
with Bungay, who declares about half of the text philosophically
irrelevant). Equally, the idea has become a clicM, or at least a
historical topos which returns in judgements about contemporary
art again and again, seemingly easily applicable to the constantly
and radically changing character and circumstances of art. It returns
from Heine's prediction of the end of the art-period with the death
of Goethe, to Arthur Danto's locating it sometime after World War
II. And, of course, it is this judgement of Hegel, in a reinterpreted,
weakened form, that stands behind all theories of artistic decadence,
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be they Marxist in origin, as with Lukacs and Adorno, or Heideggerian.
For Heidegger, this judgement remains in force as long as Geschick
does not decide otherwise about the truth of our whole world-
understanding, which originated with the Greeks.
In view of the many voices of dissent and reinterpretation I would
like to present here a rather orthodox defence of Hegel: that what
he meant by the thesis of the 'end of art' is quite true, and discloses
something of genuine importance about the situation of the arts in
modem times. There is, of course, a catch in this simple-minded
confession of a straightforward Hegelianism: that what Hegel really
meant is strictly true. To unravel this meaning it is worthwhile to
recall that Hegel declared not only the end of art, but in the same
breath the end of religion and the end of history too. By reminding
ourselves of what is implied in this last, the seemingly most outrageous
claim, we can perhaps gain a better understanding of how to approach
at all the presumed end of art.
When Hegel affirms the end of history in normatively conceived
modernity, he certainly does not mean thereby some apocalyptic
ending of all times. A history in its empirical meaning, as a sequence
of irreversible changes brought about by human actions and activities,
will continue into an indefinite future without foreseeable end. What
ends is what the philosopher-always searching for reason in the play
of accidentalities-understands by history: a progressive process
towards the full comprehension of the meaning, -the requirements
and the conditions of the realisation of freedom. This history has been
realised in the past in the successive radical transfonnations of the
forms and constitutions of states, always the results of the deeds
of world-historical individuals who were able to hit upon the solution
to the crisis of their age. These crises were rooted ultimately in the
expectations of freedom that a social-political system evoked in its
members, and the barriers to their realisation which were imposed
upon them by the same institutional structure that brought them to
life. And this history ends when its end, its telos, becomes achieved.
That is in modernity, with its complex system of institutions, in
principle able to reconcile the demands of self-realisation of developed
personalities with the functional reqUirements of social-political
integration-in so far as that is at all possible under conditions
of human finitude. There is nothing utopian-as any reader of the
Philosophy OfRight will know-in this end ofhistory: finitude involves
the uneliminable role of accidentality in the life of individuals,
and Hegel discloses a whole series of contradictions even within
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the normatively conceived framework of modernity. But these
contradictions can be, not eliminated but pacified in their systematic
effects, constrained by the very working of modern institutions in the
course of their continuous adaptive change through rational reform. It
is this which is the end of history. For even everyday consciousness
vaguely presumes that history is what happens to us, and happens
owing to some memorable deeds deciding the fate of nations and
states. From now on, however, history is made, and made rationally,
by the anonymous many. It is rational, not so much because of the
depth of their insight or the energy of their will, but because of the
inner logic of their positionally determined, interlocking activities.
History ends because the distinction between the philosophical and
empirical concepts of history disappears. What philosophical inquiry
had to discover through the hard labour of thought in history, acts of
freedom for the realisation of freedom, from now on becomes prosaic,
empirical reality. Die Vollendung ist das Ende-reaching the end is
the ending. The vocation is now fulfilled; what remains is its everyday
exercise.
This parallel with the end of history may bring into focus that one
can only comprehend the Hegelian idea of the historical end of art
through the understanding of what Hegel regards as the teleological
end, the 'vocation' of art. Art in its empirical sense certainly will
not disappear: 'we may well hope', he writes of his present, 'that art
will always rise higher and come to perfection' (103). What is ended
is what philosophy discloses as the meaning of art, and it is ended
because its task has been fully realised. In the course of its historical
development art has become fully and solely art, and thereby lost its
deepest sense and highest vocation.
What is this vocation, the philosophical concept of art? Hegel
discusses this question in the whole first part of the Aesthetics. But
he does so in a rather strange way; he does it twice. In the first
part he offers a systematic 'deduction' of the concept and essential
characteristics of the work of art from the metaphysical idea of beauty.
But before that, in the long Introduction, he presents a reverse train
of thought. In an informal manner, largely through criticism of some
popular theories of art, he deduces from the empirical concept of art
that beauty is the sui generis value criterion of the aesthetic sphere
which works of art ought to satisfy. These two 'deductions' should
be strictly equivalent, but they are not. What in fact is deduced from
the metaphysical idea of beauty is not the work of art in general
but the classical work of art. And what is derived from the empirical
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conception of art is not really beauty as such. It is the idea of a
necessary correspondence between sensuous appearance and meaning-
content that is satisfied not only by works of beauty, even though it
is these which fulfil its norms most fully and in a perfect way. In
fact Hegel ends his relevant considerations in the Introduction with
an emphatically sharp formulation. Not everything which is beautiful
is a work of art; and the lack of beauty is not necessarily an artistic
defect, the sign of an 'unintentional lack of technical skill or practice'
(74), but may well be something demanded by the character of the
aesthetic content, making the product a work of art though no more
corresponding to the Ideal.
This incongruence between the two 'deductions' offers the key
to the Hegelian understanding of the end/vocation, the philosophical
concept of art. Art is rooted in the same human need that gives rise
to religion and philosophy: to find and disclose an abiding meaning
in the seemingly senseless accidentality and contradictoriness of
finite existence, in the externality and alienness of the world of life;
to make the world ultimately man's own home. Art solves this task
not through elevation in thought over the particularity and finitude
of empirical reality but within this world of appearances itself, by
creating sensuous or imagistic existents that display this meaning
for immediate apprehension. 'Thinking is only a reconciliation between
reality and truth within thinking itself. But poetic creation and
formation is a reconciliation in the form of a real phenomenon itself,
even if this form be presented only spiritually' (976).
This already determines two fundamental features of the
Aesthetics: its being an anti-mimetic work-aesthetics. Anti-mimetic,
since the vocation of art is to create something that never can be pre-
given, for it is called upon to overcome the defining feature of any
finite natural existent, its non-correspondence to its own concept.
And it is-in opposition to the Kantian aesthetics of reception and the
Romantic aesthetics of production-a work-aesthetics because in its
understanding the aesthetical is properly present only in those artistic
objectivations which as art-worlds satisfy the indicated need in a
requisite way. The task of a philosophical comprehension of art is
to disclose their structure in art's historical change and in the various
modalities, kinds, of art.
From this, clarification of the empirical concept of a work of art
follows directly. It is an intentionally created individual sensuous
object or image configuration which, in and through its concrete,
apparent characteristics, directly displays a unitary meaning for
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immediate apprehension. TIlls, on the one hand, defines the ontological
status of the art work as the untranslatable Schein, an inwardly reflected
immediate existent which is what it is only owing to a pointing to
(Verweisung), an expression of, something else as its own essence.
On the other hand, it also posits the work of art in two different,
though interrelated, normative dimensions. The first is the complete
unity, full interpenetration, of the outer and the inner, of sensuous or
imaged externality and immanent meaning: the value standard of
beauty. It requires that every sensuously discernible component of
the work has some meaningful significance, contributes something to
its overall meaning, the unity of which is disclosed in the free,
unenforced harmony of all the particular aspects and constituents.
Since it is the human eye that most adequately reflects the soul, the
inward essence of an individual, in this respect Hegel compares the
art work to 'a thousand-eyed Argus, whereby the inner soul and spirit
is seen at every point' (153-54). This simile will find its resonance
almost a hundred years later in one of the great poems of German
literature, Rilke's Archdischer Torso Apollos:
... denn da ist keine Stelle,
die dieh nieht siehl. Du musst dein Leben andern.
Beauty is the sui generis value of the aesthetic sphere, and in this
sense the central concept of aesthetics, the concept of artistic perfection.
But the work of art necessarily (in view of the very need of art)
stands in another normative context as well, the decisive one for its
philosophical comprehension. This is the requirement of full
correspondence between the particular and its concept, the universal
which is Hegel's ontological definition of truth. This is the viewpoint,
not of perfection, but of significance, in respect of which one must
first of all ask the question: what is the meaning-content that an art
work can bring to sensuously immediate expression? This is, however,
a badly stated question, akin to asking: what can be said by words,
or thought in general concepts? Everything and anything: the work
of art can bring forth 'every possible kind of content and worth' (47).
It belongs to the Schein character of the art work that it is endowed
with an illusion-creating power; beauty can confer the aura of
significance upon even the trivial and inessential. The real question
is: what is the highest possible accomplishment, the most significant
truth-content, still expressible in such a sensuous form? And to this
the answer is that it can disclose the highest truth: the 'truth of
determinate being [Dasein]', the objective rationality which rules
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over the course of the world and life, the Divine, the Absolute as
Spirit. And only when it does this, does the work really meet the
need that gave rise to art, the 'vocation' of art. In its philosophical
meaning, art is a form of the Absolute Spirit, of the self-comprehension
of the Absolute in human consciousness and activity. In Hegel's
historicist conception of truth this means primarily that a genuine
work of art makes manifest what was or is, for a people or epoch, the
Absolute-that is, that which is for them unconditionally and
universally valid or significant, the centre of their highest interests.
The work discloses how they conceived the ultimate powers ruling
life, the way of their world-and self-understanding. The art work
makes this manifest in a sensuous, immediately comprehensible, form,
therefore in a way available, understandable, for everyone. In its
philosophical concept it is an effective way of forming a collective
consciousness, a force of social-political integration: 'a point of
unification for men'. In respect of art, questions of cognitive
significance and of social relevance are directly linked by Hegel.
His aesthetics is work-aesthetics also in the sense that philosophical
interest in art centres on the question of how art 'works'; on the
question of its possible cognitive/cultural and social-political
functions.
The twin values and requirements of beauty and of ultimate truth
(with its associated social relevance) are in no way incompatible.
The case of their joint satisfaction, that of Classical art, represents
the fullest flowering, the realisation of the highest potential, of art.
Such a unity, however, cannot be sustained all the time. Under some
conditions it falls apart, not because of accidental circumstances but
owing to the very character of the content expressed, of the historically
specific comprehension of the Absolute. If this comprehension is
inherently abstract and undetermined, then any concrete sensuous
representation of it will be overdetermined, and therefore the form
only ambiguously related to its content. This was the case with the
'Symbolic' art of the Orient: a not yet beautiful art. If, on the other
hand, the understanding of the Divine by its very nature transcends
the possibilities of being fully expressed by any sensuously individual
configuration, the form will become underdetermined in relation to
the content. This is the case with 'Romantic', Le. Christian, art, a no
more beautiful art. The development of this leads necessarily to the
end of art as a form of Absolute Spirit.
This is, in the most simplified form, the conceptual background of
the Hegelian idea of the 'end of art'. This very background, though,
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may give rise to some not infrequently encountered misunderstandings
of what Hegel meant by his thesis.
Since Hegel regards art in its highest vocation and philosophical
concept as the disclosure of the Divine in individual configurations
of sensuous or imaged nature, it is plausible to think that he means
by its end nothing more than its secularisation, in the simple sense of
the gradual disappearance from art of religious themes and subjects,
first of all of representations of the godhead. Hegel, a thinker of
onto-theology, identifies this with the loss of art's genuine significance.
The Aesthetics clearly points to such a process and portrays it as
necessary. Its necessity, however, is consequent upon the fact that
the epoch of the end of art is that of the end of religion as well.
Under conditions of modernity, organised religious life becomes a
social formality, genuine religiosity retreats into pure subjectivity of
feeling and private piety, while the dogmas of faith, constituting the
cognitive content of religious imagery, become a topic one cannot
mention without embarrassment In polite society and are treated
even by theologians in a historical manner. Therefore, 'we must take
refuge in philosophy, if we wish to learn anything about God'.4
Thus if one thinks that in Hegel the end of art is synonymous with
the disappearance of religious thematic, then one has to conclude
that modernity not so much lacks genuine art but rather lacks the
presence and the consciousness of the Divine itself, of the Spirit.
This is hardly Hegel's view.
The equation of the disclosure of the Divine with the representation
of God or gods rests, however, on a basic misunderstanding. It
conceives (just as the imagery-thinking of religion does) the Divine
as Deity, as some Supreme Being or beings transcending the world
of empirical existence. But for Hegel the Divine is the Absolute Idea,
the objective Logos of Being which is externalised in an alienated
form in nature and comes to self-comprehension only in the
collective historical consciousness of human beings. The finite is the
infinite-in so far as it overcomes its finitude. And since the vocation
of art is the disclosure of the Divine in the form of sensuous, therefore
finite, reality, it can most adequately fulfil its task if it takes for
its central object of representation not the Absolute, Spirit as such,
but 'the human element in spirit' (279), the human being in his/her
spirituality, in his/her relation to the Absolute. Hegel's conception
of art is not theocentric, but explicitly anthropocentric. 'Since the
objective and external, in which Spirit becomes visible, is ...
determinate and particularised throughout, it follows that the free
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spirit which art causes to appear in a reality adequate to it, can in its
shape be only spiritual individuality equally detennined and inherently
independent. Therefore humanity constitutes the centre and content
of true beauty and art ... '(432). Art is foremost the cultural fonn of
human self-discovery.
This radical anthropocentrism finds perhaps its clearest
expression in Hegel's discussion of the limitations of Classical art,
the art of beauty. The usual criticism of Greek religious art emphasised
its anthropomorphism, its inability to comprehend and express the
diremption (separation) and contradiction between nature and spirit,
the finite and the infinite. On this view the Greek gods and their
artistic representations in sculpture and poetry are and can be
beautiful, because they are 'not really other', but only idealised human
characters. Hegel accepts this criticism-and regards it as superficial.
For the fundamental limitation of Greek art-religion consists in the
fact that it is not sufficiently anthropomorphic; more exactly, 'it is
anthropomorphic enough for art, but not enough for higher
religion' (435). The Greek gods are only idealised human characters;
that is, in their image all that constitutes the finitude of the finite is
idealised away. They do not know and express the contradiction
between the accidental particularity of the concrete individual and
the freedom and universality of inward thinking awareness; they
lack self-consciousness. In fact they are not 'really the same'. 'The
anthropomorphism of Greek gods lacked actual human existence,
whether corporeal or spiritual' (505). And so therefore Christian-
Romantic art-the art of a religion of MellSchenwerdung Gottes, of
God incarnated into the pain, shame and death of finite existence, to
be resurrected in the spiritual faith of religious community alone-is
more radically anthropomorphic and anthropocentric than Classical
art. This makes it no more beautiful, no more perfect, but a more
true art.
This leads directly to another, even more frequent, objection to
Hegel: that the thesis of the 'end of art' is based upon the profound
classicism of his art theory, on a completely idealised conception of
the accomplishment of Greek art which then overcharges art with
a function that it never did or could fulfil. No doubt this thesis is
directly related to its counterpart and supplementation, the idea of the
unsurpassable perfection of Classical art, of which Hegel says, 'nothing
can be or become more beautiful' (517). This perfection, however, is
not meant by Hegel in terms of a purely formally characterisable
(and therefore in principle recrearable) beauty. In fact for the naive
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reception found in modern times (a subject-attitude that alone is truly
adequate to art), these works do not appear as perfect at all. They
seem to be cold and lacking individuality, especially in comparison
with the inner warmth of Romantic painting. 'We cannot take it
amiss if people do not show that profound interest in profound
sculptures which they deserve. For we have to study them before we
can appreciate them' (797). Their full appreciation today demands
the historico-hermeneutical reconstruction of their original meaning
in its thoroughgoing unity of the aesthetic, religious and political
significance. And while this idea may reflect Hegel's idealisation of
the reality of the Greek poliS as the 'beautiful work of political art',
at least he makes a plausibly argued case for it. It was the epic poets
of Greece who first transformed the amorphous and incoherent
multitude of local myths and legends into the Pantheon and theogony
of Olympic gods, the framework for the consciousness of the cultural
unity of a nation. It was the plastic representations of these gods that
endowed them with a determinate shape and character for religious
imagination, and due to the presence of these sculptures the temples
were not only places for worship but the abodes of deity. These
temples of tutelary gods defined the public space of the polis, the
place for its communal meetings and institutions, from which its
political unity acquired a physical presence and reality. More
importantly, it was the epic and tragic portrayal of gods and heroes
as ethical powers and ethical individualities, each with its particular
pathe, which created tradition-fixed clusters of exemplary conduct
pertaining to appropriate situations. In this way-through the aesthetic
power of affirmative identification-individuals were directly,
practically, oriented in their public behaviour. Hegel may well have
overestimated the practical effectiveness and political significance
of such an aesthetically constituted world view, but this at least was
not based on any 'classicist' bias on his part. For he applied the same
considerations, though in a less elaborated way, to the 'Symbolic' art
of the Orient as well, with reference to a lack of clear discrimination
between sacred and literary texts (for example in the case of Indian
epic). This was done first of all through an analysis of monumental
architecture (the dominant art of the Symbolic art form) as the
embodiment and physical manifestation of the unifying political
power of the state. (Appropriately for Symbolic art, he undertook
its analysis in a symbolic form, through discussion of the tower of
Babel.) As a result Hegel regarded the question of the instrumental
versus autonomous role of art as devoid of meaning in respect of
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either its Symbolical or Classical form, for in both cases the spheres
of art, religion, and politics are not clearly demarcated. It is, however,
this question which becomes determining for the development of
Romantic art.
Christianity as revealed religion is no more created or co-
constituted by art. The content of the faith is independent of, and
pre-given to, artistic representation. 11lis representation becomes
something secondary and superadded, no more essentially demanded
by religious consciousness. But this relegation of art to an instrumental,
illustrative position in respect of religion primarily follows from the
character of the content of the faith. Christianity as the religion of
inward, spiritual reconciHation, in the diremption of the finite and
infinite withdraws from the externality of appearances into the depth
of SUbjectivity. From this viewpoint, all sensuous-natural things
constitute 'not the presence of God but only powerless accidents
which in themselves can only attest to him, not make him appear'
(374: my correction of translation). 11lis content cannot therefore be
brought, at least not in its entirety, to that concrete, individual,
sensuous presence which art by its very nature demands. Only some
particular aspects of it are suitable for aesthetic purposes at all, and
even they do not generally satisfy the requirements of beauty.
The whole process of the development of Romantic art is portrayed
by Hegel as a process of its emancipation from this instrumental
functionalisation, as the liberation of art to that full autonomy which
belongs to its very concept as spiritual activity. 11lis is a process of
secularisation which, of course, runs parallel to the already indicated
Verweltlichung (becoming worldly) of religion, with the loss of its
community forming cultural power. 11lis secularisation of the arts is
not, though, to be understood only in its negative aspect, as the
disappearance of religious thematics. It means an ongoing conquest
by art of the object and content which, by a conceptual necessity,
always constituted the centre of its interest: human life, in its whole
complexity and diversity. In our time,
... art strips away from itself all fixed restrictions to a specific range of
content and treatment, and makes Humanus its new holy of holies: i.e.
the depths and heights of the human heart as such, mankind in its joys
and sorrows, its strivings, deeds and fates.... [N]othing that can be
living in the human breast is alien to that spirit any more.... [Art] does
not need any longer to represem only what is absolutely at home at one
of its specific stages, but everything in which man as such is capable of
being at home.... It is the appearance and activity of imperishable
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humanity in its many-sided significance and endless all-round
development which in this reservoir of human situations and feelings
can now constitute the absolute content of art. (607-8)
The development of Romantic art thus leads to the realisation of the
concept of art, of art becoming fully and solely art. But this is the
very end of art, the end of art in its 'highest vocation' and philosophical
concept as a spiritual-cultural power able to form collective
consciousness and legitimately claiming universal significance. In
the Introduction Hegel argued that when art aims to bring home to us
'everything which has a place in the human spirit' (46), simultaneously
it loses the capacity to disclose that 'common' and 'substantial end'
which can confer unity on diversity and difference. One could argue,
in the spirit of Hegel, that under conditions of modernity (as he
conceives them), the deepest need that gave rise to art disappears: the
need to create a sensuous reality in which particularity and universality
are reconciled. The need disappears because in the modern world as
the end of history, this reconciliation becomes an empirical fact.
Human beings no more need the world of art to possess some concrete
imagery in which they are at home; they are, or at least now can be,
at home in the world of social actuality. But art is not only not
needed for this task of reconciliation; by its own means, no more can
it bring the reconciliation to an adequate, if imaged, presence. For it
is 'the firm and secure order of civil society and the state' (592), the
impersonal working of this vast institutional structure as the rational
mediating mechanism of social objectivity, that now effects, in
principle, a reconciliation that can be penetrated only by speculative
thought. The developed individuals of modernity, who do not identify
themselves with, but have a distanced, reflexive relation to their
social position and function, are no more representatives of the social
whole or of its distinct 'ethical powers'; their deeds and fate no more
can disclose the ultimate truth of the totality:
[I]n the world of today the individual subject ... does not appear
himself as the independent. total, and at the same time individual
living embodiment of this society, but only as a restricted member of
it. ... [H]e is not, as he was in the Heroic Age proper the embodiment of
the right, the moral and the legal as such. The individual is no longer
the vehicle and sole actualisation of these powers as was the case in the
Heroic Age. (194)
Therefore when art, with its individuating means of representation,
attempts to address itself to the ultimate question of the age, to that of
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the relaHon between the striving of the free personality for a self-
fulfilling life and the objective, anonymous rationality of modem
institutions, inevitably it will falsify the complex reality of modernity.
It must either (as Hegel's critique of the modern idyll demonstrates)
mendaciously conceal, or at least ignore, the never eliminable
possibility of conflict and contradiction between the striving of
the free personality and the power of unforeseeable accidentality
which follows from the enmeshment of individual fate in the
complicated web of depersonalised interactions. Art then becomes an
apologetic ideology characterised by 'mawkishness and sentimental
flabbiness' (191). Or, it will abstractly fix this opposition, the contra-
diction between 'the poetry of the heart and the opposing power of
circumstances' (1092) as something untranscendable. Thereby it will
express only the equally distoruve ideology of a rebelIious, anarchic
SUbjectivity. This may have had a subjective jusHfication in the pre-
revolutionary world of the struggle against the ancient regime, but
now is simply anachronistic. By becoming autonomous, art ceases to
be a form of Absolute Spirit; by finding what always was its ultimate
subject matter, HUTnallus, human life in all its freedom and variety,
it also loses the ability to make manifest its highest, universally
binding, ends in their historical, cultural relevance to the present.
Under contemporary conditions art must content itself with the parual,
with the finite: it 'makes itself at home in the finite things of the
world, is satisfied with them, and grants them complete validity'
(594). Certainly it can, and ought to, disclose this finite reality as
suffused and enlivened by Spirit, as man's 'own human and spiritual
work' (574). But it no more discloses Spirit in its infinity as working
itself through all finite circumstances, actions and interests towards
unconditional, universally valid, and therefore community creating
ends.
I think that the indubitable effectiveness of the Hegelian thesis of
the 'end of art', its being a constantly renewed topos in discussions
of the art of modernity, is due principally to the radicalness with
which it identified the problematic situation of modem art, the lack
of clarity and the insecurity surrounding its social relevance and
cultural accomplishment. It is a problematic situation due not to
some external limitations, but to the autonomisation of art as the
telos of its development, to art becoming fully and solely art and
nothing else. However, the idea of the 'end of art' in itself amculates
this situation only negatively, as the loss of its 'highest vocation', of
its power to disclose for immediate apprehension the ultimate, binding
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ends of a community, and in this way to be an effective form of
practical action orientation and socio-cultural identity. But Hegel
also clearly maintains that art in the empirical sense can flourish and
'rise ever higher' even after its 'philosophical' end. One may then
expect that his work-aesthetics, so decidedly concentrating on the
question of the socio-cultural 'work' art can perform, also will tell us
something of its possible function and significance after its end.
Before looking at the Aesthetics with this question in mind, I will
consider two interpretations of the 'end of art' which from our
vantage point of acquaintance with the post-Hegelian development
of art may seem plausible, even attractive, but which are, perhaps
regrettably, irreconcilable with Hegel's own conceptualisation. One
of these has been proposed by Danto:5 that art ends because, beginning
with Duchamps' Fountain and culminating in Warhol's Brillo Box,
it becomes its own philosophy, an 'infinite play with its own
concept',6 Danto, as a 'born-again Hegelian', makes this proposal
not as a strict interpretation of Hegel but as the free application of
some of his ideas to understanding the evolution of contemporary art.
It would hardly constitute an objection to him, therefore, if one
simply suggested that no doubt Hegel would have rejected such a
view furiously-as is attested by his deep hostility towards works of
Romantic irony. A work which playfully deconstructs the conditions
of its own possibility satisfies the requirements neither of beauty
nor of truth, and thus it is for Hegel not a work of art at all but a
piece of harmful ideology. But one can formulate more general
objections, in Hegel's spirit, against seeing in this type of ironic,
deconstructive self-reflexivity the main function 'post-historical' art
is capable of fulfilling. It usually demands a relatively high level of
philosophical sophistication to appreciate the point of such works of
art; and once they are 'decoded', once the provocative surprise of
making these abstract ideas present as a sensuous object or happening
is gone, they seem to be exhausted. They lack not only the immediacy
of impact but they do not sustain an impulse to linger upon them
with an ear or an eye 'that never can be sated'. Furthermore, to have
this power of provocation presupposes that art and its concept still
has some genuine interest and importance for us, that it still possesses
some other forms of relevance that can engage us directly.
A different approach was suggested in an interesting paper by
Karsten Harries.? He identified the end of art with the victory of the
tendency of ['art pour ['art, with the emergence of the pure aesthetic
attitude directed solely to the aesthetic form of the work. The problem
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with this interpretation is that Hegel's Aesthetics does not really offer
conceptual means for the articulation of what would in this sense
constitute the purely aesthetic qualities of some sensuous or imaged
object. The great strength of his theory, his insistence upon the
historicity and the mutual conditioning of content and form, can be
seen at the same time, in retrospect, as also its weakness. Since Hegel
insists on the primacy and the determining role of content in this
relationship of mutuality, he cannot admit the possibility of
a form which could create its own content, independent of any pre-
given meaning. This is especially clear in his unambiguous rejection
of absolute music (music without text) as a 'misfortune' which is 'not
strictly to be called art' (902). Hegel does accept as legitimate (as we
shall see immediately) the tendency towards the emancipation of the
sensuous material of art, but only under the condition that this material
still serves as the vehicle of expression of some meaning, even if this
meaning (as with his beloved Italian operas) is of no consequence or
interest.
We will not find in the Aesthetics any explicit and coherent
discussion of the question: what function and significance can art
works possess after the end of art? Hegel is not engaged in speculations
about the future of art; historical prophecy is not within the competence
of philosophy. However, at different places and rather disjointedly,
he does offer a number of observations concerning tendencies which
he regards as significant and valuable in the development of
contemporary art. These may allow us to formulate a more general
answer to the question.
When Hegel states that art is a thing of the past, he means above
all that for the contemporary recipient art first and foremost is the
art of the past. This historicisation and museum-placing of art which,
as Hegel clearly indicates, goes together with the broadening of the
temporal and geographical compass of the aesthetically relevant
traditions, plays an important functional role in modernity. The
great art works of the past open the way to the understanding of
those cultures that constitute our spiritUal prehistory; they are the
most important constituents of our 'historical memory'. They are the
background against which we can comprehend the present itself as
historical, as our own-therefore changeable-work. Interest in and
acquaintance with the masterpieces of the past is thus a basic element
of that formal cultivation (jormelle Bildung) without which the modem
individual cannot establish an adequate, self-reflexive, critically
affirmative relationship with the general conditions of his/her life.
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If the art works of the past retain their relevance because the
aesthetic power of their beauty (or sublimity) makes us involved in
the quest for their truth, in the disclosure of their meaning content,
even though this quest now requires historico-hermeneutical
reflection, then the problematic character of living, contemporary art
aesthetically manifests itself in a disjunction between beauty and
truth that allows only a narrowly circumscribed and insecure space
for their, always partial, unification. In Hegel's understanding the
evolution of contemporary art proceeds in two opposed directions.
One pole is constituted by works of beauty, whose content is without
any particular relevance or interest. Examples are Dutch landscape
and still life painting, and, most of all, the modern Gesamtkunstwerk,
the contemporary opera. What makes painterly representations of
commonplace objects and musical performances of obsolete, often
stupid, texts aesthetically significant, is perfection of technical skill
and execution, which infuses them with the subjectivity of vision and
emotive expression, making 'poetical' exceptions to the overall prose
of everyday existence. These works, with their magic of colour and
expressive singing voices, make perceivable the most fleeting
impressions of the senses and the minutest changes in feelings, which
normally escape our attention. In general, they bring to presence the
relatedness of the phenomenal world to man, the fittedness of the
humanised world of appearances to our subjectivity. They function as
works of a spiritualised enjoyment, of a humanised, reflective
sensibility and free fantasy, of the joy, or at least Gemutlichkeit, of
cultivated civic, burgerlich, existence. This constitutes the limit of art
at this pole. When this warmth of subjective vivacity and the spell of
appearance is lacking, when the work becomes merely a faithful
imitation of prosaic reality, the realistic-naturalistic portrayal of the
everyday, it ceases to be a work of art.
At the other pole of contemporary art stand works of genuine
socio-cultural relevance, of 'great ethical interest' and 'genuine
ethical pathos', which is how Hegel characterises the historical dramas
of Schiller. But they achieve this end only by sacrificing the
harmonious objectivity and immediacy of beautiful completion to the
intellectualisation of the work of art, the intrusion of an abstract,
didactic, authorial intent. Even at this price, they still cannot serve the
end of direct, practical, action orientation. Since under the conditions
of modernity 'universal ends cannot be accomplished by a single
individual' (1224), the tragic denouement, the fated failure of heroic
individuality, lacks the concluding accord of reconciliation that would
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allow immediate, affirmative identification with the hero. We do not
leave the modern theatre with 'a relieved heart', but with the confused
feeling of an 'unhappy bliss in misfortune' (1232). This does not
fortify the viewer to a definite ethical orientation but rather spurs
himlher on to independent reflection upon the hard ethico-moral
choices in life. TIlis can lead to confusion; the subjective play with,
and dissolution of, all ethical standards can become the end of the
work, as in Romantic irony and 'subjective humour'. Such works
annihilate the objectivity of both content and form, representing 'only
a sporting with the topics, a derangement and perversion of the
material'to 'emphasise the subjective wit of the author' (601). This
again transgresses the limits of art, the work ceases to be a work of
art even in an empirical sense. Contingent externality and contingent
interiority, subjectivity, represent the opposed but interrelated limits
of 'post-historical' art.
In between the two limits there is, however, an ill-defined territory,
upon which it is still possible, if only in a partial and fragile way, to
reunify beauty and truth, aesthetic immediacy and socio-cultural
relevance. Hegel calls it 'objective humour'. His discussion, at least
in the published text, is laconic and fragmentary, making interpretation
a risky affair. In general, he seems to mean the aesthetic realisation
of a subjective attitude which Willingly immerses itself in, abandons
itself to, the object. Thereby the representation becomes the expression,
or at least the symbol, of some inward relation with the world which,
through this objectification, loses its merely private character and
becomes re-experienceable, an aesthetic summons to a shareable form
of, or attitude towards, life. The concrete instances of such 'objective
humour' which Hegel cites are, however, bafflingly heterogeneous.
On the one hand it seems to be exemplified by Dutch genre paintings
as aesthetic articulations of a national self consciousness. These works,
masterfully evoking, even in representations of the most vulgar, even
ugly, scenes of everyday life, a spiritual cheerfulness, an all-pervading
attitude of life affirmation, of the ease of being at home in a world
created by the prosaic labour and the heroic historical struggle of a
small nation, serve the function of communal identification. They are
certainly particularistic and limited, even perhaps narrow minded, in
their bourgeois cosiness, but genuinely co-constitutive of the formation
of a national unity.8 But then, he refers to this concept of 'objective
humour' what seems to be precisely the opposite case: Goethe'sWest-
dstlicher Divan, a late cycle of poems attempting to transpose the
spirit of Persian lyric poetry into contemporary emotive and expreSSive
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idiom, which Hegel admired. For him, this is the outstanding example
of modern art making the life attitude of an alien culture directly
re-experienceable by aesthetic means. This serves the function of a
cosmopolitan education, elevating the private citizen, the bourgeois,
into a citoyen of the world, spiritually open to other forms of conduct
and experience.
Lastly, it seems that he also subsumes under this category the
accomplishment of the Bildungsroman, novels of education, with
their objective irony of practical reconciliation. They portray growing
up as apprenticeship to the rational realities of the present, against
which, as a senseless and alien order of things, the youthful heart had
revolted in the name of higher ideals and the infinite right of feelings.
Ultimately, youth becomes 'as good a Philister as any' (593).
These dispersed observations about the various possibilities of
'post-historical' art clearly demonstrate that Hegel did not identify
the 'end of art' with its simply becoming functionless, losing all
vestiges of social relevance. But the concrete cultural functions he
indicates as aesthetic potentialities in his analyses seem to be ad
hoc, accidental and heterogeneous: cultivation of sensibility and
intellectualised representation of the conflicts of modernity for
conscious reflection, formation of a national cultural identity and
cosmopolitan education, etc. But this is, I think, exactly what Hegel
meant to say. Art after its own end is problematical, because what
function it can possess becomes an unsettled problem, to which all
answers and solutions will remain ad !loc, accidental, transient and
heterogeneous. Art which became solely and fully art, that is
autonomous, won for itself not only freedom from any prescribed
content, independence from all hierarchies of themas and styles,
but emancipation from a pre-given, settled function as its vocation
as well. This is undoubtedly a great loss; art no more expresses the
'substantial spirit of a people', that unifying communal ethos which
has an unconditional socio-political relevance. Under modern
conditions, what genuinely unifies the individualised and privatised
members of the state is the working of its impersonal, bureaucratic
institutions, the rationality of which can be grasped by conceptual
thinking alone. But this loss is simultaneously also a gain in freedom,
an expansion of potential. The artist now has the freedom not to
find, but to create, through the power of aesthetic representation
and in response to particular situations, new types and models of
socio-cultural relevance. The artist can endow hislher art with new
modalities of meaning. Even at the end of art, the art work can and
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ought to 'work'. Hegel's philosophy does not allow for the complete
self-enclosure of the aesthetic sphere. 11lis would not be the 'end'
but the disappearance of art, its transformation into a mere hobby
or game.
The deeply problematical and paradoxical character of 'post-
historical' art consists in the fact that while it endows the artist with
this freedom, the power to make it effective does not reside with
his/her art and artistry. For the emancipation of the artist from the
'bondage of particular subject-matters and a mode of portrayal' (605)
also makes the recipient free. The ontological status of the work of art
as Schein implies that it is what it is only for another. As a sensuous
object it is 'incomplete; it has the status of a work of art only for, in
relation to, the recipient. 'The art-work for itself is something lifeless,
not self-consciousness; to it pertains a community [es gehOrt eine
Gemeinde dazu] which knows and imagines what is represented as
the substantial truth'.9 Its sensuous imagery character makes direct
('naive') apprehension the adequate subject-attitude towards art.
Immediacy, however, is always mediated immediacy in Hegel; it
always presupposes some unreflectively accepted form of
conceptualisation, some unconscious prejudgements. Thus the
naive, immediate reception of art is again typically restricted to
those historical epochs when individuals share a common culture as
the natural and evident precondition of understandability, when they
are the 'representatives' of an ethical substantiality. For modern
individuals, works of art are objects ofpersonal taste, critical judgement
and reflexive interpretation. As Hegel at one point remarks, even
the painting of the penitent Maria Magdalena can now be equally
an object of religious piety or a mild erotic stimulation. Whether or
not a work of art achieves its intended impact, fulfils its projected
function, transmits its envisaged meaning, depends not only, not even
first of all, on its immanent qualities. It depends upon whether or not
it finds an audience disposed towards these ends; and this is largely a
matter of concrete historical conjuncture and social constellation.
Whether an art work 'works' in any sense-and for Hegel this means
whether or not it is a work of art at all---depends upon something
external to it. This explains Hegel's maddening habit, even after the
most positive characterisation of some contemporary tendency in
art. or art work, of raising the question: is this, however, still a work
of art?-and then leaving it unanswered. For artistic modernity does
not simply replace the traditional question 'Is this beautiful?' with
some much broader concept of aesthetic evaluation, for example the
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Schlegelian 'interesting'. What it asks, again and again, is the
question 'Is this at all art?' To this question, no answer can be given
on the basis of formally definable aesthetic criteria or merely
historical considerations alone. Ultimately the answer will depend on
the facts of reception (including, of course, intra-art reception and
influences). This is co-determined by what is external to art, by the
accidentalities of the present. This is the ultimate meaning of the 'end
of art', the fundamental paradox of modem art. Art, becoming fully
autonomous, made the determination of what is art a matter of
heteronomy. For, Hegel would say, nothing is truly autonomous but
Spirit is the totality of all its manifestations.
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